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Abstract 
Today most multi-domain networks authentication systems provide data security and mutual 
authentication with asymmetric and traditional public key cryptography. There exist some problems, such 
as the overhead of passing certificates, the more complexity of management certificates and network 
bottlenecks and so on. These schemes can’t protect the safety of multi-domain interoperability in 
distributed network effectively. Aiming at these problems, the paper proposes an identity-based multi-
domain authentication protocol among domains in large-scale distributed collaborative computing network. 
It adopts bilinear mapping and short signature technology to achieve mutual authentication between 
entities in different domains, which overcome the complexity of certificate transmission and bottlenecks in 
the scheme of PKI-based.  Analyzed shows that this scheme has anonymity, security and supporting 
mutual anonymous authentication and it is suitable to use in security alliance authentication mechanism in 
large distributed network. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with the rapid development of network application in all kinds of fields, network 
applications are more and more extensive. All sorts of businesses or activities, such as network-
based searching, remote collaborative designs, remote medical treatments, resource sharing, 
remote control and intelligent houses, may have requirements of cross-domain authentication. 
There also have the problems of cross-domain work in new network application forms such as 
grid computing, cloud computing, Internet of things etc. The study of cross-domain 
authentication theory and technology has becoming an urgent problem.  
Although some authentication services, such as Kerberos [1], can provide multi-domain 
authentication, the scheme is related with the complexity of symmetric key management and 
key consultations. If there are N Kerberos domains and each of them want to trust each other, 
the number of key exchanges is N(N-1)/2, and it cannot deal with the anonymous problem 
effectively. Reference [2]-[4] introduced the use of lattice theory in cross-domain authentication, 
each of them used lattice to the construction of the network structure. They provided a better 
solution to the potential safety problems caused by the authentication from an independent 
privileged body. And they also solved the problems of network bottlenecks and single point 
crash in PKI authentication framework. 
Reference [5] summarized the existing technologies of certification in grid environment, 
such as PKI in grid authentication infrastructure, the model of user privacy protection and role-
based private authentication protocol. Each of them was just for one problem in multi-domain 
authentication; they only solved the privacy of user’s identity or the authentication mechanism, 
without considering all the factors as a whole. However, there are also problems of the 
difficulties in PKI certificate management and maintenance, the complexity of authentication 
path finding and the low utilization of network resources. 
The other is authentication framework based on traditional PKI [6],[7]. The procedures 
of credentials under public key cryptography are heavy burdens. Specifically, the consumptions 
is caused by the construction of credential paths, the query of the status of credentials and 
transfer of credentials. It can also cause the network bottleneck of authentication center when 
under frequent cross-domain accesses. Reference [8] has purposed an identity-based multi-
domain authentication model, which the premise is that all the authorities must be mutual trust. 
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Also, the scheme requires the key parameters of all domains to be same. .It could not avoid the 
authority faking the members to cross-domain access resources. Reference [9],[10] adopt 
signcryption method to implement mutual authentication between entities, but it is only suitable 
for a single domain. Reference [11] extends the method. It enable the mutual authenticate of 
entities in multi domains, but the precondition of this scheme assumes that Private Key 
Generator (PKG) of each domain is honest. Because the PKG has the private keys of all the 
members within its domain, if PKG is malicious, the security of the users’ private keys could not 
be guaranteed. At present, in the mutual authentication protocol, SSL/TLS authentication 
protocol (SAP) is the most popular protocol and has become standard protocol to ensure Web 
security. Reference [12] propose two authentication schemes that support keyboard as well as 
graphical mouse-based input that map password characters to other regions of the password 
space. This shields the user’s password from being known to the adversary thus deflecting 
shoulder-surfing and spyware attacks. Reference [13] presents a multi layer perception neural 
network-based method for network traffic identification. 
Reference [14] assumes that all the entities in the network trust an authority agency, 
and this is not real, for in this condition the problems of bottleneck and the one point failure are 
too also heavy. Reference [15] presents a way to find the target trust center through a trust link. 
If the trust link is too long, the affection of cross-domain authentication will be too low. The 
issues with cross-domain authentication have been discussed in many papers. For example, 
both direct cross-domain authentication and transitive cross-domain authentication are 
supported in Kerberos [16],[17]. By using transitive cross-domain authentication, a principal can 
access the resources in a remote domain by traversing multiple intermediate domains if there is 
no cross-domain key shared with the remote domain. 
In this paper, we analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of traditional multi-
domain authentication schemes. We propose a multi-domain authentication protocol based on 
dual-signature, which mainly solves the problem of the network bottleneck and key escrow in 
traditional PKI authentication protocols. The protocol also achieves the anonymity of the two-
way entity authentication. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Bilinear Group 
Firstly, we give the definition of bilinear map, assuming that G1 is additive group, GT is 
multiplicative group with same prime order p,  is the security parameter, let 
G1=<g1> be generated by  and the solution of discrete logarithm over the G1 and GT is hard. 
And is a computable mapping, and  has the following properties: 
1) Bilinearty: For all , and , there is ; 
2) Non-degeneracy: There exits ,   such that ; 
3) Computability: For all , there exits an efficient way to calculate . 
Inference 1: For all , there is . 
Definition 1 Discrete logarithm problem: For given groups ,  and .  
are generators of and respectively. For the above definition we can define the following the 
difficult solution problems. Discrete logarithm problem: set , look for an integer  
and make it to meet . 
Definition 2 Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (BCDHP): Suppose a 
triad , for all , find the element . We say that algorithm 
has advantage in solving CDH in  if . 
Definition 3 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH): Suppose a quad
, for all , decides that is there . 
2 1,kp k 
1g
e 1 1: Te G G G 
1,u v G *, pa b Z ( , ) ( , )abe au bv e u v
1,u v G ( , ) 1e v u 
1,u v G ( , )e v u
1 2 1, ,u u v G 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )e u u v e u v e u v 
1G 2G TG 1 2,g g
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1 1 1, 'g g G a
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Definition 4 Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group: The problem of CDH is difficult to 
solute but the DDHP is easy. With this feature group called for the GDH group. 
Definition 5 ( , )t   CDH assumption: The CDH assumption holds in group 
if no time adversary has advantage at least in solving CDH in . 
 
 
2.2.  Multi-linear Mapping  
Multi-linear Diffie-hellman hypothesis: Firstly given the definition of multi-linear 
mapping. Suppose that the discrete logarithm problem of and is hard. 
Let , be two groups of the same prime order . The mapping is 
called  multi-linear mapping, if it satisfies the following properties:  
1) Multi-linearity: For any of *1 2, ,..., m pa a a Z  and any of 1 2 1, ,..., mg g g G , there is 
1 2 ...
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) m
a a a
m m me a g a g a g e g g g . 
2) Non-degeneracy: If is a generator of , then 1( , ,..., )e g g g  is also a 
generator of . 
3) Computability: For all , there exits a efficient way to calculate 
. 
Definition 6 Decisional Multi-linear Diffie-Hellman(DMDH) problem is that given 
1 2 1 1, , ,..., mg a g a g a g G   and , it is to determine if there is 1 2 1...1( , ,..., ) ma a az e g g g  . 
Definition 7 Hypothesis of DMDH: Hypothesis of DMDH is that solving decisional 
multi-linear Diffie-Hellman problem is difficult. That is to say that there cannot be a probability 
polynomial time algorithm which can solve Diffie-Hellman problem. 
 
 
3. Multi-Domain Authentication Based on Dual-Signature 
In this section, a new multi-domain authentication protocol is designed. There are 
several steps will be described.  
The system is composed by  domains. Each domain is independent and autonomous. 
Each domain consists of a  (key management center) and a number of 
members within the domain. distributes and manages some keys of their 
members within its domain. 
 
 
3.1. Dual-Signature  
(1) Setup phase: select an addition group and a multiplicative group with same 
large prime order ,  is a generator of and  is a generator of , is 
an efficiently computable bilinear mapping, , , 
 are hash function. 
Each selects a number randomly, and calculates , 
where are the public/private keys of . Similarly, each member  selects a 
number randomly, and calculates , where are the public/private keys 
of . 
(2) Alliance-domain system keys agreement: All the can negotiate an alliance 
public/private key pair  by multi-linear mapping, the process are as follows: 
( , )t  
1G t   1G
1G 2G
1G TG p 1 1:
m
Te G G
m
1g G 1G
TG
1 2 1, ,..., mu u u G
1 2( , ,..., )me u u u
Tz G 
n
(1 )iKMC i n 
(1 )ju j iKMC
1G TG
p
1g 1G 2g 2G 1 1: Te G G G 
*
0 :{0,1}* ph Z *1 2 1, :{0,1}*h h G
*
3 : T ph G Z
(1 )iKMC i n  *i ps Z 1i ip s g
( , )i is p iKMC iu
*
i px Z 1i iy x g ( , )i ix y
iu
iKMC
( , )sk pka a
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Each  calculates the alliance private  with the private key  and public keys 
of other members .  
 
  
 
Each calculates the alliance corresponding alliance public key
. 
(3) Dual-signature and register: Suppose there have numbers in the domain 
.using the set expresses the identities set of these numbers, and 
is the identity of   . 
1) Each calculates  and , then sent  to all the 
members in its domain. 
2) Each member  of the domain received the , and calculates
， , and selects a number randomly, calculates ,  
then sent to its . 
3) The received the message sent by , then verifies equation 
. If it is correct,  can ensure that is sent by , 
and   is unique within that domain . 
4) Then  can compute, , then sends to . 
5) After received the , each calculates ,and verifies the equation 
, If it is correct,  can ensure that is sent by . 
6) Where the and are dual-signature by user and , because they include 
the secret information of  and , and they also can be verified by the public keys of 
and . 
 
 
3.2. Dual-Signature Authentication 
To ensure the security, members from different domains need to be mutual 
authenticated when they access resources each other. To speed up the resource access and 
avoid the bottleneck problem during the authentication, this paper purposed a multi-domain 
alliance authentication protocol based on dual-signature, which enables any two members to 
direct authentication and does not need to transfer the ticket by the third party (the 
authentication center).  
Let two domains in the alliance-domain system be  and  respectively, the 
public/private key pair of in domain is , and the public/private key pair of 
in domain is , where , and the public/private key pair of alliance-domain 
system is . The members  and  are internal members of  and respectively. 
iKMC ska is
jKMC (1 , )j n i j  
1
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n
s
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as h e p g p p
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
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0 ( )j j jr x h id j jr  *j pm Z j j im p 
( , , , )j j j jy id  iKMC
iKMC ( , , , )j j j jy id  ju
1( , ( ) ) ? ( ( ) , )j 0 i i 0 j je h ID P e h id y g iKMC j ju
jy
iKMC
1
0( ( )( ) )i i i sk i jh ID s a s    i ju
i ju 1j j im 
1
1 1( , ( )) ( ( ) , )j i pk 0 ie P a e h ID g g   ju i iKMC
j j ju iKMC
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( , )pk ska a iu jv iD jD
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is the private key of , and is the public key of . is the private key of , and 
is the public key of . The public keys and the identities of every one are public 
.When want to access resource from , the process of multi-domain authentication and 
session key agreement are described as follows: 
(1) in domain calculates and ,then sends the public 
information  to verify ,where is a dual-signature that in 3.1 (6). 
(2) After receiving the messages , with its private key to calculates 
,and verifies whether   is satisfaction.  
(3) If and ,   can ensure
are sent by ,and is a member in the domain , then  calculates 
and sends the public information   to verifier ,where is a dual-
signature that in 3.1 (6). 
(4) After receiving the messages , with its private key to calculates 
,and verifies whether   is satisfaction.  
(5) If and ,   can ensure
are sent by , and is a member in the domain . 
Because two-way can mutual verity by the dual-signature of their KMC and themselves, 
and signature message is the identity of their KMC, which can be sure everyone belongs to 
which domains, the cross-domain authentication in the multi-domain system is successful.  
 
 
4. Performance Analysis 
4.1. Correctness Analysis.  
Multi-domain authentication protocol of this paper is established based on dual-
signature. In order to ensure the safe authentication when the domains access resources each 
other, the correctness of the dual-signature must be ensured for first time. 
Theory 1: If everyone computes correction, the legal member can be verified. 
Proof: 
1) Since sig i jui x y , if the jv  computes correction, then  
  
1
1
1
1
( )j j sig
j i j
i i
ver x ui
x x x g
x g y




 
 
 
2) Since 
 
1
0
1
0 1
( ( )( ) )
( ( )( ))
j i i sk i j
i i sk j
h ID s a s
h ID s a m g
 

  
  ,
1 1
0 1( ( )( ))i j j i i skm h ID s a g     ,  
 
and the properties of the bilinear pairings, we have :  
ix iu 1i iy x g iu jx jv
1j jy x g jv kID
iu jv
iu iD sig i jui x y i i ix 
( , )sig iui  jv i
( , )sig iui  jv jx
1( )j j sigver x ui
 1 1( , ( )) ( ( ) , )i i pk 0 i je P a e h ID g ver  
1( )j j sig iver x ui y
  1 1( , ( )) ( ( ) , )i i pk 0 i je P a e h ID g ver   jv
( , )sig iui  iu iu iD jv sig j iuj x y
j j jx  ( , )sig juj  jv j
( , )sig juj  iu ix
1( )i i sigver x uj
 1 1( , ( )) ( ( ) , )j j pk 0 j ie P a e h ID g ver  
1( )i i sig jver x uj y
  1 1( , ( )) ( ( ) , )j j pk 0 j ie P a e h ID g ver   jv
( , )sig juj  jv jv jD
kID
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4.2. Anonymity Analysis 
The paper proposes a two-way anonymity authentication protocol, which do not need 
the real identities of both entities when they do mutual authentication. Each member jv verify 
the identity of iu  only by the equation 
1
0 1( , ( )) (( ( ) , )i i pk i je P a e h ID g ver   , therefore, jv
don’t  know the identity of iu ,it only know the identity iID  of the iKMC that  iu  belong to the 
domain and the public key iy  of iu . 
 
 
4.3. Security Analysis 
The security of multi-domain anonymity authentication protocol is based on the security 
of the dual-signature. The security of the signature method proposed in this article relies on the 
BCDHP.  
Theory 2: Under the above assumption BCDHP, the proposed multi-domain anonymity 
authentication protocol is secure. Any attacker cannot forge dual-signature by eavesdropping on 
messages transmitted over the public channel. 
Proof:  
According to the contradiction proof principle, assume that an attacker can use an 
efficient probabilistic polynomial algorithm A  to forge dual-signature of the proposed protocol. 
We use the contradiction proof technique to prove that the proposed protocol is secure under 
the assumption BCDHP. We can use the algorithm A to construct another efficient algorithm 'A
to distinguish  from 1abg based on BCDHP. 
(1) An adversary P tries to learn the signature by eavesdropping on messages 
transmitted over the public channel. The adversary can obtain the messages ( , )sig iui   of iu
transmitted, where sig i jui x y and i i ix  . Here, assume that adversary cannot obtain the 
private key ix  of iu . Under this assume, we shall prove that: 
1
0 1( , ( )) (( ( ) , )i i pk i je P a e h ID g ver   and 10 1( , ( )) (( ( ) , )i pk i je P a e h ID g ver    
are computationally indistinguishable, where  is a random value in 1G . 
(2) Using the contradiction proof, assume that there is an efficient probabilistic 
polynomial algorithm A to distinguish 10 1( , ( )) (( ( ) , )i i pk i je P a e h ID g ver   and
1
0 1( , ( )) (( ( ) , )i pk i je P a e h ID g ver   . 
Based on the algorithm A .We can construct another polynomial algorithm 'A to 
distinguish 1 1 1( , , )ag abg bg and 1 1( , , )ag abg  , where  is a random number and 1G  , 
*, pa b Z . First, take the value 1ag , 1abg and  as the input of algorithm 'A . Let 1i ag  , and 
i i  . Then, algorithm 'A randomly selects  from *pZ , Then , 'A calls A with these values 
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.If 1( , ( )) ( , ( ))i i pk i i pke P a e P a     ,that means key 1bg  .therefore, adversary P
can use algorithm 'A to distinguish 1 1 1( , , )ag abg bg and 1 1( , , )ag abg  ,which is a contradiction 
for the BCDHP. Thus, that our proposed protocol is secure under the assumption BCDHP. 
Compared with the existing cross-domain authentication, our advantages are as 
follows:  
(1) Authentication protocol in communication and computation is smaller than SAP 
scheme, and the efficiency of the certification is higher than SAP scheme. 
(2) Our scheme greatly simplifies the system architecture compare with the traditional 
PKI-based authentication framework, and saves system cost. 
(3) Compare with the literature [18] in the certification framework, this paper proposed 
protocol can provide mutual authentication in different trust domains, and the application is 
broader, more in line with the actual needs of a distributed network environment. 
(4) This paper proposed authentication protocol has forward security, and in the 
Reference [16] the non-interactive authentication session key is static, if an attacker controls a 
user's private key, he can calculate the session key that between this user and  any entity, it 
does not have forward security. 
 
 
4.4. Computation and communication consumption Analysis 
In this section, we compare our basic scheme with the prior schemes in the light of key 
size, communication overhead, processing complexity and their security. The consumption of 
computing and communication mainly reflect in modular exponentiation E , bilinear operation
pr , multiplication over group pm  . In the protocols, any node calculates the path key of all its 
ancestors and other correlative computing, which can be pre-computed. So the consumption of 
computing about the signature certification would be negligible[19]. We compare our protocols 
with other corresponding authentication protocols in communication cost in Table 1. We use 
notations as follows: 
 
ep :    Modular exponentiation. 
pr :    Bilinear map. 
pm :   Multiplication over group. 
iG :   The order of iG . 
q :    The length of q . 
( , )P V : Signing message and Verify signature. 
ES :    The algorithm to establish parameters. 
EX :    The algorithm to extract keys. 
 
 
Table 1. The Performance Comparison of Difference 
 Reference [20] Reference [21] Our scheme 
Computing 
: 0
: 3
( , ) : 2 2 3
ep pr pm
ep pr pm
 
 
ES
EX
P V
 
: 0
:1
( , ) : 2 3
pm
pr pm
ES
EX
P V
 
: 0
:1
( , ) : 2 3
pm
pr pm
ES
EX e
P V
 
Communication 1 2( , ) 3 3G q G :P V  1( , ) 2 G q:P V  1( , ) 4 GP V :  
Against active 
attacks Yes No Yes 
Authentication  One-way authentication One-way authentication Two-way authentication 
Anonymity/ 
traceability No No Yes 
 
 
As so in Table 1, our protocol is more efficient than Reference [20]’s protocol with 
respect to both computing and communication.  The computing is similar to Reference [21]’s 
and the communication is larger than Reference [21]’s. However, our protocol is the more 
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secure than Reference [21]’s, and our scheme can achieve to two-way authentication, so both 
sides are unforgeable when their communicating.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Multi-domain alliance-authentication is required for security in multi-domain network 
environment. The scheme of anonymity authentication protocol purposed in this article can 
ensure the security while share the resource among multiple domains. The anonymity can 
protect the privacy of each entity, and each entity can access cross-domain resources needless 
the intervention of the key management center, which provide good flexibility. It can avoid the 
bottleneck problem and the complexity of the transfer tickets of the traditional pattern based on 
PKI. It is safe and practical. 
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